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Ms. Munday is first witness called by Pima County. They sought to illustrate that release of the database could harm counties with less security. They wound up eliciting a security horror story that undermined their own position.
Gila county has their GEMS database prepared by a contractor. It is not checked forensically by any independent or internal expert. They are completely open to fraud occuring anywhere upstream in the production process, either by vendors, the contractor, or a third party able to penetrate the security of any upstream party. It is a truly horrifying situation.
the director relies solely on logic and accuracy tests that can be easily faked by anyone with access to the MDB database prior to those tests. This situation, even more than Pima County, is why we need independent party oversight of these election materials.
Please keep in mind that the following is not a transcript, but a
paraphrased and condensed summary. Thanks to David Safier for his
tireless effort to make these summaries a great resource for the
Summary of testimony by Dixie Mundy
Direct Examination by Deputy Pima County Attorney Thomas "Tad" Dinker, co-counsel for Pima County.
Dixie Mundy has been the Gila County Director of Elections for 16 years. She is a member of the Election Officials of Arizona.
Gila County uses the Diebold system, including GEMS software.
Gila County sends its databases to the Secretary of State to obey the state statute.
The database contains parameters of elections, ballot layouts and the ability to generate reports.
Mundy considers the Secretary of State’s manual to be the authoritative source on elections. So if it says the databases are software, then they are.
A consultant lays out the ballot for Gila County. The consultant uses the previous setup in the database and modifies it for the new election. By using the prior database, we know it is correct according to Arizona statute.
GEMS is certified by the Secretary of State. A county cannot use uncertified software, nor can it use a non-electronic system.
Mundy is unaware of any security problems in GEMS. She believes that if there were problems, the Secretary of State would have notified them.
It is important to keep the public’s confidence in elections.
Someone who had a copy of the database could corrupt elections.
Cross Examination by Bill Risner.
The consultant who creates the layout for the elections is a private company: Elections Operations Service, located in Glendale, Arizona. Mundy doesn’t know how many people the company employs. It sets up elections for other counties as well.
The company may have its own copy of GEMS to create the election database.
Mundy hasn’t been informed of any defects in GEMS.
Mundy doesn’t know what is in materials she gets back form Elections Operations Services.
Mundy is pretty sure the materials are transmitted electronically from the company’s computer to the county’s vote counting computer.
The Logic and Accuracy test is the only examination of the database.
If the Secretary of State were aware of any problems with GEMS, she certainly would have contacted Gila County about the problems.
Mundy is a member of the Diebold users group. She doesn’t believe Diebold has alerted them to any software problems.
Redirect by Thomas Denker.
Mundy has visited other counties elections divisions, and security varies from county to county, but she has not seen lax security.
If one county were required to release its database, all would have to follow.
Judge Miller’s questions.
Mundy says the Secretary of State’s election manual is an essential document that explains statutes and procedures. You can follow it to conduct the entire election.
Mundy knows of no directions in the manual about who can have access to database files.
Mundy believes it would be detrimental to Gila County elections if the Pima County Democratic Party had GEMS databases, because that would allow manipulation of her database.